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AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Preventing a biological weapons attack−long a terrifying battlefield danger and now a serious threat to civilian populations as well −is a major contemporary global security priority.
-Kenneth Luongo
It's not a question of if, but when… -former Senator Sam Nunn
BACKGROUND ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
The misuse of science and technology is no longer a hypothetical exercise restricted to Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there is a very real threat of terrorists maliciously using diverted material from the Soviet's substantial stockpiles of dangerous biological materials.
Poorly secured, deteriorating sites with under-and un-employed scientists provide terrorists with potential access to usable WMD materials and the talent to develop new agents. Delivery of these materials against military or civilian populations is a major security concern of the United States, and prompted the President to publish, for the first time, the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction. 3 The emerging U.S. strategy to combat the proliferation of biological and other WMD is built on a foundation of proactive counterproliferation efforts, strengthened nonproliferation efforts and effective consequence management activities. 4 Derived from the National Strategy to Combat WMD, the counter-and nonproliferation strategies emphasize prevention of acquisition of such materials by state and non-state actors through diplomatic means, multilateral agreements, nonproliferation programs and, if warranted, export controls and sanctions. formerly employed in offensive WMD efforts to conduct peaceful research. 8 The inordinately slow progress of the BW CTR program is undoubtedly linked to the lack of a clearly defined agency leader for the effort; the three organizations appear to be cooperatively focused on the end state of the program but suffer from a lack of written, BW-specific, overarching policy and strategy. If the program is to enjoy any kind of real progress, Congress and the President must appoint and support a lead agency or oversight entity; the threat is too real to continue at the faltering, sluggish pace.
Reducing the risk of BW proliferation is clearly an important U.S. national security interest, but to do so, the CTR program expends tens of millions of U.S dollars annually 9 and has come under criticism for inadequate intent, approach, accountability and effectiveness. 10 sites to conduct what was termed "commercial civilian" microbiological activities. 22 23 The term "commercial" is used loosely because, despite lobbying for U.S. pharmaceutical investments, Biopreparat's main (and, ultimately, sole) customer was the Russian MoD. 24 25 Identifying the whereabouts of many of the former BW experts is a challenge. The drastic reduction in funding to the laboratories left many of the leading scientists possessing specific weapons-relevant skills without jobs, vulnerable to hiring by non-rational actors and posing a proliferation risk. 26 27 The DoS handles a piece of the CTR program that funds −with financial input from the European Union, Japan and Canada −projects (and thus scientists' salaries) for non-proliferative scientific endeavors. This multilateral endeavor for re-direction of the scientists is run through the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in the Ukraine. 28 The programs found work for many of these scientists, 29 but access to all scientists (especially ones of Russian origin) is admittedly limited. 30 31 This calls into question the validity of Russian and U.S. claims that the key scientists of interest are gainfully employed and not recruited into offensive programs of other organizations/nations.
Safeguarding and securing the vast network of Soviet BW facilities and the agents stored therein were primarily the responsibility of the MoD and used massive amounts of manpower.
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The guns, gates and guards employed for these purposes have all deteriorated significantly and the agents are vulnerable to internal and external theft. The U.S., led by the DTRA CTR program, is attempting to upgrade security at the FSU biological institutes, but only as participants are willing. To date, in Russia only two, albeit the largest two, of the former BW facilities have had significant security upgrades installed: Vector, where the smallpox virus is stored, and Oblensk, where anthrax research is performed. 33 34 The remaining facilities are either closed to U.S. access or subject to long-delayed schedules for security assessments.
Security activities in the other states of the former Soviet Union are more mature. After the Russians left with BW agents and delivery weapons in the 1990's, the infamous BW production plant in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, is undergoing CTR-sponsored demilitarization and destruction. 35 The Russians claim to have destroyed the agents and weapons they removed, but will not provide verification. 36 Other facilities in Kazakhstan are undergoing security assessments as jurisdiction and funds allow. In Uzbekistan, the concerns were about shrinking Aral Sea and poor physical condition of the facility raised fears of not only theft, but unintentional transport of agent by migratory animals and widespread environmental pollution. 37 The U.S. is assisting Uzbekistan with decontaminating Voz Island and dismantling the entire facility; this DTRA-led project is underway and will alleviate the security vulnerability posed by the facility when complete. 38 Despite these noted successes, the glacial pace in Russia for a seemingly simple process jeopardizes achieving totality of U.S. CTR goals anytime soon. 39 The U.S. leadership, in conjunction with its CTR partners, must insist on Russian cooperation and openness. scientists and $135 million in research grants. 51 52 Because its expertise is focused mainly in areas of nuclear technology, the DoE 
THE U.S. BW COUNTER THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

ANALYSIS OF CTR CHALLENGES AND POLICY
The challenges to formulating and implementing an effective BW CTR program are (e.g., Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, and Israel). 56 The U.S. felt that the BWC did nothing to provide effective tools for countering BW proliferation and withdrew its support from the draft protocol in July of 2001. 57 58 The role and attitudes of the players involved in BW CTR programs is of paramount importance and concern. Russia and the former Soviet states constitute a particularly serious challenge and proliferation risk because of their economic distress, the significant assets of the former offensive program and, in the case of the Russians, very limited cooperation. 59 The financial issues, in particular, have led to deterioration in the physical security of the sites and a large number of unemployed, unpaid scientists from the FSU with extensive BW expertise. 60 61 Despite the U.S. actively redirecting the programs, the "brain drain" from the laboratories was significant, with one laboratory losing 54% of its staff. 62 The U.S. may have unintentionally exacerbated this problem with elimination of plants in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan −an action that improved security, but left scientists without work. 63 The economic hardships and potential availability of these bioweapons experts were noticed by the Iranian government, who actively recruited them in the 1990's. 64 65 Besides financing scientists' salaries through grants, the U.S.
has also provided over $14 million to improve the physical security at 4 of the 49 sites identified in Russia, installing external security measures at two of the four facilities. 66 However, the Russians, despite signing a multilateral agreement to do so, are unable or unwilling to provide the resources for the security systems' maintenance and upkeep. 67 This lack of cooperation is also evident in the steadfast refusal to allow U.S. (namely DoD) access to many former Soviet BW sites. Difficulty in negotiating access is certainly due to the need to interact with nine separate Russian government organizations to obtain permission. 68 69 The Russians also insist on certain controls over their program that go against the BW CTR program's intent. They state they are justified in barring access in the interest of national security; detractors feel this is a tact to conceal the former BW program, or even a covert ongoing offensive program. 70 Lengthy
negotiations have yet to show progress in achieving a resolution on facility access. 71 The BW CTR programs in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Georgia are more progressive than in Russia, but are not without their own sets of significant challenges. Kazakhstan and the U.S. signed a bilateral agreement in December 2004 that provides $35 million for study projects related to preventing bioterrorism. However, implementing the agreement is presently in jeopardy as the Kazakhs are insisting on much more control over the steps to consolidate pathogens, secure their repositories and accommodate the U.S. demands for unfettered access to their facilities. 72 While not blatantly uncooperative, the Kazakhs are undoubtedly weary of the intrusive relationship with and academically condescending attitudes of the U.S. They have openly spoken of a need for additional financial support to convert the former BW facilities to peaceful production activities. 73 This need for funding is also true in Uzbekistan and Georgia,
where the scope appears to be somewhat smaller, but no less worrisome than in Kazakhstan.
Involved scientists of all three nations are also eager to embark upon projects beneficial to public health or commercial industries and are chafing against the U.S. CTR program's narrow field of focus. These latter challenges of insufficient funding and restricted research are not solely the fault of the U.S. and beg for expanded participation from other nations, industry and academia. A final critical point is that all of these countries are subject to political instability, thus continuity of programs is at risk when changes in regimes occur.
Not all challenges for implementing an effective BW CTR program lie with the governments of the FSU. The U.S. also brings conflicting attitudes, unfocused policies and a lack of understanding of the nations' interests and concerns. The U.S. insists on transparency, (yet refuses reciprocity), and the mandatory full disclosure of the FSU's biodefense programs does not consider their need to protect proprietary or security information. This seems a legitimate concern, harkening back to the reasons that the U.S. would not sign the verification provisions of the BWC.
The U.S. also has been exceptionally slow in articulating a written policy for agencies participating in security assistance and nonproliferation activities at BW facilities. The National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction is a broad document without specifics from which to derive detailed policies and plans. The process of creating a draft policy began in 2002, 74 but has not yet emerged from the DoD. Similarly, the DoD presently lacks a written plan to address its assistance in securing the biological sites in the FSU. 75 Without a concrete policy, the U.S.'s BW CTR program can be, and has been, applied in a seemingly haphazard, unidirectional manner. Disagreements resulted over intent while frustration fomented over progress among the participants. The U.S.'s BW CTR program also suffers from the chaos inherent in a lack of leadership within the interagency process, where, despite a group of willing partners, uneven assistance and conflicting priorities and standards are applied. As a result, the affected states in the FSU often perceive the program as heavy-handed, condescending, 76 yet unfocused and uneven in its level of enforcement. The sense of mistrust on both sides of the table is prevalent, disruptive and a probable hold-over from the Cold War. 78 Other professional, economic or security-based organizations have banded together to attempt to counter the traffic in dangerous pathogens or technologies directly related to BW development. 79 These multinational groups are just beginning to gain compliance with BW CTR policies by states of the FSU through exertion of economic, technologic and scientific pressures. 80 As the European Union (EU) becomes a dominant player on the world stage, its involvement should be encouraged, if not demanded, as a supplement to the existing efforts. EU expertise −and funds−would be a valuable contribution in the area of biological safety and establishment of EUcentric biotechnical parks at critical sites. 81 The EU also provides the advantage of ease of mobilization, economic clout from a coordinated multinational body, geostrategic objectivity and experience in developmental transition. 82 Genuinely international initiatives such as these would put a global face on the BW CTR efforts and transform the FSU states from dependent recipients to self-sustaining partners.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE CTR PROGRAMS
Members of the international commercial pharmaceutical industry comprise an underused resource for providing opportunities for economic and scientific stabilization to the FSU. 87 and a single, highly placed Russian entity that controls these facilities is a crying need. In the end, the U.S. must hold Russia to a higher standard of compliance than is presently being enforced and insist on agreement on BW CTR policies at the highest levels of leadership.
The U.S. will also benefit from employing several recommendations. First, the U.S. must direct the BW CTR program from one unambiguous authority, the DoD being the most logical candidate. Next, the U.S. must publish a unified policy and blueprint based on objectives mutually developed with the involved countries. From that, the countries must employ an implementation agreement with advocacy by the countries' leaders and extensive involvement of the scientific communities. The one-sided nature of the current endeavor without a published U.S. policy has produced little tangible benefits for either party despite an enormous outlay of capital, 88 questioning the program's balance of ends, ways and means. The U.S. must address each country's concerns about losing scientific, proprietary and economic control of their products. There can be no doubt that the efforts by each party are for their mutual benefit and that the program will lead to self-sufficient independence of the biodefense programs of the FSU states. To continue the heavy-handed, unilateral approach risks damaging U.S. credibility and threatens its ability to create an effective strategy in defending against WMD proliferation.
The U.S. BW nonproliferation program is directed at the former Soviet Union's expansive BW program and is now in its thirteenth year. The program is in keeping with the President's goals for the U.S. strategy to combat WMD, but has significant challenges. In the FSU, the mission risks strangulation by resource constraints, restricted access to facilities, and the vastness of the FSU's military and civilian biological research infrastructure. The U.S.
contributes to these challenges with no clear, overarching BW CTR governance and the lack of published U.S. policy and plan for the BW CTR. The demise of the program could signal an upsurge in the proliferation of BW by state and non-state actors. Thus, review and changes to the program are warranted in order to increase cooperation and effectiveness in BW counterproliferation efforts. A successful U.S. strategy leverages the former Soviet BW program to make substantial contributions to the region's public health and global security.
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